Harvard Professor Stephen M. Walt’s March 20, 2012 article in Foreign Policy Magazine reflects yet another example of the bash America liberal elite this time in a superficial attempt at describing the “Top 10 Lessons of the Iraq War,” without regard, of course, for the realities on the ground.. http://atfp.co/1TlspN4

It is far too early to declare whether the US won or lost in Iraq. Yet Harvard Professor Stephan Walt contends in his Lesson #1: The United States lost. It’s true after countless interviews and interrogations of high level Iraqi officials, including Saddam Hussein; there was no resurgence of a WMD program in Iraq. US intelligence agencies weren’t the only ones with “definitive” evidence of WMDs: Israelis, Italians, French, and British all purportedly had independent intelligence supporting a restart of a threatening WMD program in Iraq. Saddam Hussein proved quite effective in his efforts to mislead the West about his WMD intentions and capabilities.

The author fails to credit the coalition forces with accomplishing another much talked about mission: regime change. Saddam Hussein and his henchmen were removed from power, and Iraqis were freed from what had been a generation of Stalinist dictatorship. Iraq today is an emerging democracy. It is not perfect. It is in its infancy and, as is true of any new government, fragile and susceptible to sabotage both from within and without. Iraq is an emerging democracy in a bad neighborhood. It shares a long border and a troubled past with the Shiite Islamic theocracy of Iran and a border with the Sunni dictatorship and all around bad guy of Assad’s Syria. Both Iran and Syria continue to support violent extremists in Iraq bent on destabilizing the country. Iraq’s other neighbors are Islamic monarchies with the notable exception of secular and parliamentary Turkey. In spite of the many challenges, this “quasi-democratic government,” to use the author’s term, has since 2003 conducted two successful nationwide elections with the most recent election realizing a greater percentage voter turnout than many western democracies including the United States.

The author’s criticism of the so-called revisionist version of the surge is a typical straw man argument. In the first instance, the surge was intended to reduce the level of violence that had increased to the point of near civil war by 2007. Over the succeeding four years, violence decreased to the lowest level since hostilities began. Only after a reduction in the level of violence could the parties even begin to address ethnic and sectarian reconciliation. As the level of violence receded the US Army and the Government of Iraq cautioned that violent extremist retained the ability to conduct spectacular attacks.  All also agreed, however, that the violent extremists groups, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, al-Naqshbandia, or ISI among others, could no longer credibly threaten the government. It was during the surge that one of the prime instigators and prosecutors of sectarian violence, Moqtada Al Sadr, laid down his weapons, ordered his followers to do the same, and entered the political arena. With the addition of Al Sadr into the ruling parliamentary coalition, Maliki was ultimately able to form an inclusive government by late 2010. Though no friend of the US, the willingness of Al Sadr to join PM al-Maliki’s parliamentary coalition accomplished the US goal of an inclusive Iraqi government.

There remains ethnic and sectarian division and reconciliation is up to the Iraqis. The US surge, however, was successful in improving the likelihood of Iraqi movement on these issues.

The future of Iraq is in its own hands and today, for the first time in a generation, Iraqis are free to choose what their future will look like. Five or ten years from now historians will be able to look back at US involvement in Iraq with far more data and clearer vision. Perhaps then a more accurate picture of the success of the US involvement in Iraq will emerge.

Lesson #2: It’s not that hard to hijack the United States into a war. Elections have consequences. The elected Commander and Chief and his advisors get to set the agenda. Whether the US should have gone into Iraq, or if such an adventure was indeed a war of choice continues to be debated. How many people did it take for the US to get heavily involved in Vietnam? It was President H.W. Bush’s leadership and insistence that Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait would not stand. How many people does it take to move US Policy? The Iraq war decision making was not done in a vacuum, but in prime time TV and in front of the UN.

Lesson #3: The United States gets in big trouble when the “marketplace of ideas” breaks down and when the public and our leadership do not have an open debate about what to do. Just because the ideas that you preferred to have won the day didn’t, doesn’t mean the market place of ideas broke down. See Lesson #2 above.

Lesson #4: The secularism and middle-class character of Iraqi society was overrated. The author is guilty of painting Iraqi society with the same broad brush that fits his criticism of the neocons but, again, doesn’t reflect reality. Prior to Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s education system was the prize of all the Middle East. Engineering graduates from Mosel University and Baghdad University were of world class caliber and many went to work in the nation’s oil and gas industry. Those few technocrats still alive remained within the top levels of Iraqi ministries. Some were notorious in their graft and thievery while others, particularly in the regional oil and gas operations with whom I dealt with regularly, were highly competent, fluent in English, and experienced in western business conventions. In the 1960s and 1970s Kirkuk was looked upon as a sophisticated secular city envied throughout Iraq. Today there is a significant education and experience gap between top level management and middle management because of Saddam’s dismantling of a once great education system. However, a tradition of higher education and the desire to rebuild are firmly part of the Iraqi nation and represent the foundation for a brighter future.

Lesson #6: It’s very hard to improvise an occupation. The early years of the war clearly reflect that an effective plan of occupation was never thought out.  One of the critical lessons of Vietnam, and one which was heeded in the first Gulf War, is to engage the enemy with overwhelming force. With more than enough soldiers in the field, occupation is more easily and effectively managed.  Equally important, overwhelming numbers allow military leaders the flexibility of bringing soldiers home earlier, engendering continued public support for the war as opposed to needing to recall troops and instituting the widely unpopular “stop loss” orders.

Lesson #7: Don’t be surprised when adversaries act to defend their own interests, and in ways we won’t like. Really? Iraq taught us that our adversaries will work against our interests?

Lesson #8: Counterinsurgency warfare is ugly and inevitably leads to war crimes, atrocities, or other forms of abuse. Warfare is ugly–counterinsurgency, guerrilla, trench warfare, or columns of tanks battling it out on the plains of Europe–it’s all ugly. Atrocities have happened in every war since the beginning of time. The rape of Nanking, the Holocaust, carpet bombing of cities, ethnic cleansing, the list unfortunately goes on and on. Counterinsurgency is no worse and the reduction in violence following the surge in Iraq provides empirical evidence that counterinsurgency in Iraq led to fewer soldier and civilian deaths.

Lesson #9: Better “planning” may not be the answer. We had better get better at planning. It is the height of arrogance for a president to stand before the American people and insist that under his or her administration the US military will stay at home. Regardless of how powerful any country may be or how benevolent any country’s foreign policy may appear, there always have been and always will be challenges to the status quo and to those with the most interest in maintaining it.

Lesson #10; Rethink U.S. grand strategy, not just tactics or methods. Finally, the author couldn’t be more wrong. The days of living securely behind the great expanses of two oceans are over and they died with the advent of long-range bombers and Intercontinental ballistic missiles back in the 1960s. The attacks on America on 911 also belie the notion of our inherent security, as well as, demonstrate the asymmetrical nature of the threats faced by the US and our allies. Not since our entry into WWI has America been able to retreat into isolationism for long before another great crisis arises demanding US involvement and leadership, Libya and “leading from behind” notwithstanding.

The danger of Professor Walt’s shallow summary of the “top 10 Lessons” is the denial that there remain bad actors in the world intent upon undermining the principles of democracy and tolerance and view the US as their prime target. We have to get better at “this sort of thing” because we will be called on again to lead the world out of certain calamity, and in this role, America must have the tools and experience to better influence the outcome. Unless, of course, you think China represents a better political system to determine our future.