I wrote the following Op-Ed piece in the fall of 2011 while the US was negotiating with the Maliki Government of Iraq regarding the future status of any remaining US troops in Iraq after the previously agreed upon December 31, 2011 deadline for all troops to be out of Iraq. I reprint here because of the deteriorating situation in Iraq and the recent response by the Maliki government to a protest in Hawija in the Kirkuk Province. The response turned violent and 33 people were killed. Afterward the local tribal leaders’ comments were to the effect that peaceful demonstrations are over and it is time to pick up arms. That particular clash was Shia on Sunni. However, having taken place in Kirkuk is significant.
I lived in Kirkuk for three years as the senior economic development advisor with the Kirkuk Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and to the Government of Iraq. Over the three year period my team and I engaged in over 600 missions outside the wire to meet with provincial political leaders, Baghdad ministerial leaders, the Governor, and local farmers and business leaders. In Iraq, PRTs were diplomatic outposts of the U.S. Embassy that partnered with Brigade Combat Teams, other U.S. Agency presence in Iraq, and the local provincial governments to foster political progress and build capacity critical for a stable and democratic Iraq. In the disputed province of Kirkuk we were welcomed and the local ethnic groups recognized the positive contributions and the stabilizing influence of the PRT and the U.S. Army.
September, 2011
SUCCESS IN IRAQ HINGES ON KIRKUK
Recent comments by PM Maliki suggest that negotiations to amend the existing US-Iraq security agreement and allow continued US troops presence in Iraq are deteriorating. This is an adverse development for US interests in Iraq and in the Middle East overall. A few days earlier, when asked about continued US troops in Iraq, Secretary of Defense Panetta, underscored valid concerns regarding the need to counter the extensive influence of Iran in Iraq, and the need to continue the role of the US Army in training the Iraqi Army. However, the more immediate and most critical reason for US troops to remain and for continued diplomatic engagement in Iraq is the potentially explosive nature of the unsettled status of Kirkuk at the heart of the Kurd-Arab challenge.
The future stability of a democratic Iraq hinges on a broadly supported resolution of the political status of Kirkuk. The ancient city of Kirkuk is the home to Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, and Christians. Each can rightly claim Kirkuk as their ancestral home land. Demographic sensitivities have been a persistence obstacle toward any universally acceptable solution. Saddam Hussein, in an effort to dilute the power of the Kurds, forcibly removed thousands of Kurdish families from Kirkuk, paid off thousands of Arab families to migrate into Kirkuk, and redrew the provincial boundaries further dividing Kirkuk. The semi-autonomous region of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) just to the north of Kirkuk covets what they insist are Kurdish lands. The Arabs of Kirkuk feel threatened by the thought of a KRG administration, and the Turkmen and Christians increasingly feel disenfranchised by their growing minority status. Demographic sensitivities prevented Kirkuk from holding local elections in 2009 with the rest of the country and have been the primary obstacle frustrating a constitutionally mandated nationwide census.
Tensions remain high in the political classes between all ethnic groups in Kirkuk. The stale political leadership has expended all their political capital in maintaining traditional hard line stances as the people of Kirkuk live in diverse, mixed ethnic neighborhoods. While decisions in Baghdad and Erbil will ultimately decide the fate of Kirkuk, increasingly the major actors are playing a dangerous game of chicken.
Beyond political posturing the potential for violence is real as evidenced by the KRG’s order to move Peshmurga (KRG Regional Guard) troops south of Kirkuk City following the late February “days of rage.” On the pretense of protecting all Kirkukis from outside instigated violence, the Peshmurga move was in violation of internationally agreed upon restrictions on deployment in the Kirkuk Province. The pretense of “protection” is suspect since a US Army brigade remains in Kirkuk fully capable of supporting the Iraqi police and Iraqi Army in providing protection to the Kirkuk population.
The Iraqi central government perceived the move by the Peshmurga as an illegal incursion of hostile forces intent upon forcibly determining Kirkuk’s future status. The government’s response was to move additional Iraqi troops to reinforce the local Iraqi division. The US Army, the Kirkuk Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), and the Administration engaged in intense negotiations with Baghdad and Erbil before calmer heads prevailed and Peshmurga troops were ordered back to previously agreed boundaries.
All this while the US had troops in Kirkuk. What happens when the US Army pulls out of Kirkuk as currently planned? Does the Kurdistan Regional Government order the Peshmurga into Kirkuk to “protect” all Kirkukis since the US Army is no longer there? Will the Iraqi central government respond as it did in February by reinforcing Northern Iraqi Army troops to confront and roll back apparent Peshmurga aggression? Failure to address the political status of Kirkuk in a peaceful and inclusive process will lead to conflict that will tear away at the last 8 years of political progress bought with so much human sacrifice. A battle for Kirkuk would quickly expand and threaten the stability of all of Iraq and its emerging democracy. Redeploying Iraqi troops from other parts of Iraq to confront a Kurdish incursion compromises security elsewhere in the country, encouraging violent extremists to take advantage of the central government’s newest distraction. The recent past pointedly suggests that these developments are not just theoretical scenarios but highly likely outcomes once US troops leave. An outbreak of hostilities that threatens the survival of Iraq’s democracy would force the decision of whether to recommit US troops. Why force this president or the next to consider this question? A violent confrontation over Kirkuk is avoidable, and the US is in the best position to mid-wife a political resolution to Kirkuk thus removing a long-festering irritant to Kurd–Arab tensions.
Kirkukis fear for their property, lives, and freedom if the US Army pulls out, and have universally stated their desire for both the US Army and civilian presence to remain. The close partnership of the US Army, the civilian led PRT, and the local Iraqis envisioned by Gen. Patreus’s counterinsurgency strategy has been highly effective in mitigating local ethnic tensions, and initiating a revitalization of Kirkuk on all fronts. The US Army and the US civilian presence is highly regarded by all parties as a trusted and neutral third party partner.
The US Department of State has already made the commitment to keep a significant presence in Kirkuk by establishing a Consulate. In preparation for the pull out of US troops, the State Department is forced to present outsized budgets to pay for contractors to provide security and movement capabilities in a high-risk environment, one of the rolls currently fulfilled by the US Army. But the contractor solution as a replacement for the US Army’s presence is expensive and diminishes the true value the US Army brings to Kirkuk and the future of Iraq. Providing security to US diplomats is only one (though admittedly important) role the US Army plays in Kirkuk. The stabilizing influence of the US Army presence, viewed as a friendly face throughout the district and sub districts of Kirkuk, is hard to overstate. The political process can move forward only when there is confidence in security. In this time of severe budgetary concerns, a continued US Army presence in Kirkuk would be considerably less costly and far more effective than private security for hire.
Kirkuk has enormous potential to contribute to a peaceful and prosperous Iraq. Replacing uncertainty with stability and predictability would encourage international investors to re-evaluate their hesitancy to invest in this oil rich province, resulting in much needed employment and raising the standard of living for all Kirkukis. Kirkuk sits atop approximately 4% of the world’s proven crude oil reserves, yet only two of over 30 approved IOC’s bid on the supergiant Kirkuk oil field during the first bid round in June, 2009. This lack of interest was a commentary on the political uncertainty of Kirkuk. Much needed private and public investment to renovate an existing pipeline would nearly double northern Iraq export capacity. Kirkuk has the largest associated gas processing plant in the country, and increased crude oil production would require expansion. The Ministry of Oil is eagerly courting international investors to build four new oil refineries in Iraq, one of which would be built in Kirkuk. Beyond oil nearly 80% of the economic activity in Kirkuk is agriculture and related businesses. Traditionally, Kirkuk has been part of the bread basket of Iraq. The agriculture sector is ripe for new investment having already received targeted US assistance.
Only the Iraqis can develop and support a broad-based political resolution to the status of Kirkuk, but the US can and must remain a valued and welcomed partner.
We cannot turn this into a “Charlie Wilson’s War” moment where short sighted domestic politics trump national strategic interests. Anyone who has served in Iraq knows its complexity and the challenging environment. We all want American soldiers home. But to leave with unfinished business only to be morally compelled to return to what then will be a much more dangerous environment would be far worse. With the US as a partner on the ground, Kirkuk could once again become the shining star of Iraq, and a significant contributor to its prosperity. Ultimately a stable and democratic Iraq will be a valuable ally to the US and a strong bulwark against expanding Iranian influence.
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